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Abstract
While religious beliefs are typically studied using questionnaires, there are no standardized tools available for cognitive psy-
chology and neuroscience studies of religious cognition. Here we present the first such tool—the Cambridge Psycholinguistic
Inventory of Christian Beliefs (CPICB)—which consists of audio-recorded items of religious beliefs as well as items of three
control conditions: moral beliefs, abstract scientific knowledge and empirical everyday life knowledge. The CPICB is designed
in such a way that the ultimate meaning of each sentence is revealed only by its final critical word, which enables the precise
measurement of reaction times and/or latencies of neurophysiological responses. Each statement comes in a pair of Agree/
Disagree versions of critical words, which allows for experimental contrasting between belief and disbelief conditions.
Psycholinguistic and psychoacoustic matching between Agree/Disagree versions of sentences, as well as across different cate-
gories of the CPICB items (Religious, Moral, Scientific, Everyday), enables rigorous control of low-level psycholinguistic and
psychoacoustic features while testing higher-level beliefs. In the exploratory Study 1 (N = 20), we developed and tested a
preliminary version of the CPICB that had 480 items. After selecting 400 items that yielded the most consistent responses, we
carried out a confirmatory test–retest Study 2 (N = 40). Preregistered data analyses confirmed excellent construct validity, internal
consistency and test–retest reliability of the CPICB religious belief statements. We conclude that the CPICB is suitable for
studying Christian beliefs in an experimental setting involving behavioural and neuroimaging paradigms, and provide Open
Access to the inventory items, fostering further development of the experimental research of religiosity.
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In psychological studies of religion, religious beliefs and atti-
tudes are typically assessed by standardized questionnaires and
scales, such as the Christian Orthodoxy Scale1 (Fullerton &
Hunsberger, 1982) and the Francis Scale of Attitude toward
Christianity (Francis & Stubbs, 1987). These and similar scales
are successfully applied to study social and developmental areas
of the psychology of religion, e.g. addressing topics such as
religiosity and life satisfaction in older individuals
(Hunsberger, 1985), attributional styles of religious individuals
(Lupfer et al., 1988), parent-child dynamics in emerging religi-
osity (Leonard et al., 2013) or the association between religiosity
and conservatism (Lewis & Maltby, 2000). However, despite a
large number of questionnaires and scales available to study
religiosity (for reviews, see Hill &Hood, 1999; Hill, 2013), there
are no standardized tools available for behavioural and neuroim-
aging studies of religious cognition.
Neurocognitive studies typically rely on the accuratemeasure-
ment of time between the presentation of independent factors,
e.g. visual stimuli or auditory tones, and dependent factors, e.g.
subsequent behavioural and neurophysiological responses, such
as reaction times (RT) or latencies of brain responses such as
event related potentials (ERP). In the context of cognitive studies
of religion, verbal stimuli coinciding with an individual’s belief
system are often expected to be more immediately accessible for
cognitive evaluation, yielding faster RT. In this context, RT
seems to reflect both the semantic complexity of the religious
stimulus and the cognitive processes underlying religious beliefs,
and has already been successfully employed in behavioural stud-
ies of religious cognition (Cavrak & Kleider-Offutt, 2015; Sharp
et al., 2017; Wenger, 2004). However, single words are usually
presented in such studies, such as God attributes (Sharp et al.,
2017). While such studies are useful in assessing basic doctrinal
beliefs, longer phrases and full sentences would be needed to
express more complex forms of religious beliefs, such as “the
Bible is the most important source of life instructions”.
Unfortunately, there is no validated set of religious belief state-
ments available for such studies.
Going beyond cognitive assessment-based research on reli-
gion, an increasing number of studies tap into the neural process-
es underlying religiosity (Brown & Strawn, 2012; McNamara,
2009; van Elk & Aleman, 2017). While most of the neural stud-
ies of religion focus on religious experiences and practices, such
as mystical experiences and prayer in adult individuals
(Beauregard & Paquette, 2006, 2008; Cristofori et al., 2016;
Doufesh et al., 2012; Greyson et al., 2015), there is also a grow-
ing interest in the neural basis of religious cognition. For instance,
several studies have investigated the N400 component, a nega-
tive ERP deflection peaking around 400 ms post stimulus in the
central parietal area, in response to statements that contradict
individual beliefs (Izzidien & Chennu, 2018; van Berkum
et al., 2009). N400 is typically evoked by a semantically incon-
gruous word that triggers a relatively low-level violation of the
semantic prediction, e.g. “He took a sip from the transmitter” as
opposed to “He took a sip from the waterfall” (Kutas &Hillyard,
1980). Importantly, a growing body of evidence suggests that
N400may also be triggered by a high-level linguistic violation of
one’s world knowledge or individual belief system (Coronel &
Federmeier, 2016; Fondevila et al., 2012, 2016; Hagoort et al.,
2004; Lindeman et al., 2008; van Berkum et al., 2009). For
instance, van Berkum et al. (2009) presented moral belief state-
ments, such as “I think euthanasia is an acceptable/unacceptable
course of action”, to members of a relatively strict Christian
political party, and non-religious individuals. As predicted,
value-inconsistent words elicited a negative N400 response,
confirming that semantically congruous words that contradict
individual moral beliefs modulate N400 amplitude.
Several studies have investigated whether paranormal and
religious beliefs also modulate N400 responses (Fondevila
et al., 2016; Izzidien & Chennu, 2018; Lindeman et al., 2008).
For instance, Fondevila et al. (2016) reported N400 amplitude
differences in response to intuitive sentences (e.g. “From his
mind emerged the idea”), non-religious counter-intuitive
sentences (e.g. “From his mind emerged the house”), and reli-
gious counter-intuitive sentences (“From his mind emerged the
moon”), which were evaluated either literally or metaphorically.
However, it is doubtful if participants perceived the last category
of sentences as religious, as all of them were Spanish students,
whereas sentences were extracted from non-Christian mytholo-
gies. Thus, rather than directly tapping into religious cognition,
the study seemed to assess N400 dependency on different de-
grees of metaphors; for instance, ”religious'” counterintuitive
sentences were rated more metaphorically than non-religious
counterintuitive ones. Izzidien and Chennu (2018) used the
N400 paradigm to assess the implicit responses of Muslim grad-
uates to the test sentence “I believe Islamic law is fair”, which
was presented multiple times within a longer list of control
sentences. While all participants (N = 10) explicitly agreed with
the test sentence, its N400 response resembled the N400 re-
sponse to control sentences to which participants disagreed,
pointing to an inconsistency between the explicitly held religious
belief and its implicit neural processing. Unfortunately, the study
is limited to the analysis of just one specific Muslim belief,
whereas most psychology of religion studies focus on a broad
range of Christian beliefs, experiences and practices (Hood et al.,
2018).
1 The qualifier ‘Orthodoxy’ within the ‘Christian Orthodoxy Scale’ refers to
the orthodoxy (that is, the authorized or widely accepted belief, theory and
practice) of self-proclaimed Christians with reference to wider Christian the-
ology. It should not be confused with Orthodox Christianity, which is a par-
ticular Christian tradition in the same way that Catholicism and Protestantism
are particular traditions within Christianity. To avoid any confusion, in this
paper we write ‘orthodox’ (lowercase) to refer to authorized and widely ac-
cepted Christian belief, and ‘Orthodox’ (uppercase) in the few cases where we
refer to Orthodox Christians. In keeping with other literature, we retain the
capitalization in ‘Christian Orthodoxy Scale’ when referring to the scale.
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Currently, there is no validated inventory for carrying out
behavioural and/or neuroimaging experiments of Christian
beliefs. Such an inventory would allow researchers to measure
response times and neurophysiological responses to belief
statements and would enable a more mechanistic approach
to religious cognition, thereby facilitating interaction between
the cognitive science of religion and other fields of cognitive
psychology and neuroscience. We propose that such an inven-
tory should meet the following criteria:
1) Belief statements should be audio-presented. This avoids
issues with individual differences in reading speed/skill
(Bell & Perfetti, 1994), and allows for analyses to be time-
locked to the presentation of specific words. Visual presen-
tation techniques that would allow for similar timing accu-
racy (such as the moving-window paradigm) compromise
on the naturalness of language processing. Thus, all
sentences should be pre-recorded and audio-presented.
2) The critical word should be placed at the end of the belief
statement. Response times indicating sentence comprehen-
sion and/or sentence plausibility judgment are commonly
locked to the offset of the sentence, using both behavioural
(Caplan & Waters, 2005) and electroencephalography
(EEG) (Connolly et al., 1995) paradigms. The sentences
should disambiguate at the end of the phrase, so that the
meaning of the statement only becomes clear at the final
word (Bekinschtein et al., 2011; Izzidien & Chennu, 2018).
3) Each belief statement should have two orthogonal ver-
sions constructed with identical strings of words except
for different critical words which lead to either Agree or
Disagree responses. Having identical strings of preceding
words allows for the main body of the statement to be
psycholinguistically and psychoacoustically matched across
versions, thus ensuring that any behavioural and/or neural dif-
ferences in response toAgree andDisagree sentences are due to
the processing of the final critical words rather than content or
auditory differences in the preceding parts of the sentence.
4) Linguistic properties of critical words should be matched
across Agree and Disagree statements. To ensure that par-
ticipants’ responses to Agree and Disagree versions of each
item are not affected by the linguistic properties of the critical
word, the Agree and Disagree versions of critical words
should be matched for word frequency, length and sound
intensity. To achieve this, each pair of beliefs statements
should have a “sister pair” of statements with reversed asso-
ciation between critical words and Agree/Disagree responses,
such that any response bias engendered by a particular critical
word occurs equally in Agree and Disagree statements.
5) There should be control conditions for religious belief
statements. RT or neural response differences between
Agree and Disagree responses to belief statements, within
and betweenChristian andAtheist participants, could be due
to individual differences in language comprehension (Kidd,
Donnelly, & Christiansen, 2018), or intelligence (Deary
et al., 2001; Shcherbakova et al., 2017). Hence, in order to
draw inferences specific to religious cognition, a set of state-
ments in another domain of abstract thought would be need-
ed as a control condition, such as moral beliefs, abstract
scientific knowledge or empirical facts about everyday life.
6) Properties of critical words should be matched across
categories. To allow for a fair comparison of responses
to statements in experimental and control conditions, the
critical words should be matched across conditions for
word frequency, length and sound intensity.
Aiming to facilitate behavioural and neuroimaging re-
search of religious cognition, we have developed a new inven-
tory of Christian beliefs, the Cambridge Psycholinguistic
Inventory of Christian Beliefs (CPICB), which meets the
aforementioned requirements. We have piloted it
behaviourally with 20 participants (10 Christians and 10
Atheists—see Methods for definitions of participant groups)
and found high internal consistency and construct validity. In
the following, we (i) describe the development of the CPICB,
(ii) report exploratory pilot results of its construct validity and
internal consistency (Study 1), (iii) describe the experimental
design of the confirmatory study with new groups of 20
Christians and 20 Atheists (Study 2), and (iv) report the con-
firmatory assessment of the construct validity, internal consis-
tency and test–retest reliability of the CPICB (Study 2). The
data analysis plan for Study 2 was registered at the OSF
Registries before data analysis began, see https://osf.io/vrnxg/.
Study 1: The development and exploratory
assessment of the Cambridge Psycholinguistic
Inventory of Christian Beliefs
In Study 1, we created and tested an extended version of the
inventory (480 items), aiming to remove problematic state-
ments before carrying out a confirmatory Study 2 with a
shorter final version of the inventory (400 items).
Methods
Inventory statements
The first version of the inventory consisted of 480 statements, of
which 120 related to Christian belief (or lack thereof; to be
returned to in more detail below), 120 to moral beliefs (these
are generally agreed-upon aspects of good/bad behaviour rather
than debated topics such as euthanasia or abortion), 120 to ab-
stract scientific knowledge (specifically scientific statements that
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are accepted as fact but which a non-specialist individual cannot
empirically test, instead relying on expert opinion), and 120 to
everyday knowledge (i.e. information that most people acquire
through direct experience). These categories were selected to
reflect beliefs and knowledge on a scale from individual (per-
sonal beliefs) to factual (accepted by all). Religious beliefs are
very personal and vary from individual to individual evenwithin
a seemingly-singular faith community, moral beliefs are gener-
ally agreed upon at a societal level, abstract scientific knowledge
is generally accepted as a “fact” but can change as new discov-
eries are made, and everyday knowledge relates to facts learned
from personal experience. The statements were designed to elicit
a response detailing the participant’s level of agreement with the
statement on a 5-point scale (strongly disagree to strongly
agree). Items in the Religious category were created such that
each statement is expected to elicit opposite responses from
orthodox Christians and Atheists, while items in the other cate-
gories are expected to elicit the same responses from both
groups.
Statements were created in sets of four, consisting of two
“sister” pairs. Within each pair, one version is expected to
generate an “agree” response, and one a “disagree” response
and between sister pairs the critical-word-to-expected-
response pairing is reversed as shown in Tables S1 and 1.
Within each pair, the two sentences were identical ex-
cept for the critical word, which determined the expected
response. All four statements shared a “baseline” segment
(the word or words before the critical word), and sister
pairs featured the same critical words but framed so that
each critical word generated the opposite expected re-
sponse. This was done to avoid the possibility that re-
sponses would be affected by the features of the particular
critical word (e.g. word familiarity) through ensuring that
all features of critical words (frequency, length, familiarity,
etc.) were matched between the Agree and Disagree items.
Items in each condition covered a range of topics, as shown
in Table S2.
Critical words were a maximum of three syllables long, and
the mean length (in syllables) and frequency (as measured by
the SUBTLEX frequency database based on subtitles of
British television programs; Van Heuven et al., 2014) was
approximately matched (pending full matching following se-
lection of the final 400 items for Study 2) across conditions.
Inventory development
During the development of the CPICB inventory, draft ver-
sions were sent to three groups of experts for feedback and
comments.
& The Religious items list was first sent to lay members
of different Christian denominations (Anglican,
Pentecostal, Adventist), asking them to report whether
they agreed with the individual items provided.
Following this, the Religious items list was sent to
both Christian and Atheist “experts” who provided
feedback on the content of the statements, particularly
whether they felt that most Christians/Atheists they
encountered day to day would be likely to give a re-
sponse in the expected direction. These experts includ-
ed local priests, ministers and priests-in-training from
a variety of Christian denominations, including the
Anglican, Roman Catholic and Baptist churches in
Cambridge, as well as leaders of both national and
local atheist/sceptic organisations, such as Humanists
UK.
& The Scientific items list was sent to University of
Cambridge scientists working in each of the fields covered
(astronomy, physics, Earth science, biology, medicine),
who were asked to check the factual content of statements
and give their comments.
& The full list of items (from all conditions) was sent to four
native English speakers (a mixture of Christians and
Atheists) who provided feedback on the general intelligi-
bility of the items.
Several rounds of revisions were made to the items follow-
ing feedback from these three groups.
Recording of sound files
Items were recorded for auditory presentation by a female
native English speaker using specialist recording equip-
ment in a soundproof booth. Following recording, sound
files were spliced (using Audacity software) so that the
main part of the sentence was identical for each pair and
the baseline segment (minimum length 110 ms) was iden-
tical across all four versions, providing a sufficiently long
time window for the 100 ms ERP baseline. The two in-
stances of each critical word were also identical. This en-
sured that items in any pair differed only in the critical
word, and that across sister pairs, the baseline + critical
word was identical across Agree and Disagree versions,
as shown in Table 1.
In some item pairs the length of the baseline as recorded
was naturally longer in one version than another due to the
differing onsets of critical words. In such cases, the duration of
the baseline was manipulated so as to be somewhere between
the two natural lengths, and sound files were carefully spliced
so as to maintain the natural rhythm and sound of the sentence
while maintaining the splicing formula shown in Table 1. In
order to avoid an occasional acoustic noise at the onset or
offset of sentences, we inserted a 100 ms silent gap at the
beginning of each item, and a 15 ms silent gap at the end of
each item. Spliced sound files were then equalised to a mean
intensity of 70 dB using PRAAT software.
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Participants
The main aim of Study 1 was to identify which inventory
items successfully elicited the responses we expected from
the two groups, in order that we could then select the most
successful items for the final list used in Study 2. For this, we
specifically recruited participants with strong Christian/
Atheist views by advertising our study on the online portal
of Cambridge Psychology Research and university advertise-
ment boards, local churches and atheist societies, as well as by
sending an invitation to an email list of the Faculty of Divinity
at the University of Cambridge and through word of mouth.
All participants were aged 18–45 and identified themselves as
native speakers of English. Volunteers completed an online
screening questionnaire, and 20 participants—10 Christians
and 10 Atheists—were selected from amongst those who
met four criteria for being either a Christian or an Atheist:
(1) self-identification, (2) responses on the Christian
Orthodoxy Scale (COS) (Fullerton & Hunsberger, 1982), (3)
responses to a question about belief in God from the
International Social Survey Programme2, and (4) frequency
of taking part in religious practices, see Table S3.
The selected 20 participants (14 female; age range 18 to 45
years, M = 25.3, SD = 6.8) were matched by age (Christians:
M= 25.1 years; Atheists: M= 25.6 years; independent-samples
t test: t(2,18) = 0.16, p= 0.88) and strength of orthodox Christian
beliefs or their rejection (Christians: M = 62.1, Atheists: M = -
62.4; independent-samples t test of absolute values: t(2,18) =
0.09, p = 0.93). We asked Christian participants to self-identify
which denomination (or none) they belonged to, andwe received
a mix of responses indicating that our participants were spread
out across "Anglican" (3), "Evangelical" (1), "Protestant" (3),
"Orthodox" (1), and "Catholic" (2).
Participants signed an informed consent form and took part
in a behavioural pilot experiment, for which they were com-
pensated at a rate of £10 per hour. The study protocol was
approved by the Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics
Committee (approval no.: PRE.2018.040). The study was car-
ried out in accordance with the guidelines of the Helsinki
declaration for the treatment of human participants.
Behavioural testing
The experiment took place in one of the behavioural testing
rooms of the Department of Psychology at the University of
Cambridge. The room was equipped with a laptop (Apple
Inc.) connected to a 22-inch LCD screen, a standard
QWERTY keyboard, a pair of headphones, a desk and a chair.
The experiment was programmed using MATLAB
(MathWorks, Inc.) with the Psychophysics Toolbox version
3 (PTB-3) (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997).
At the beginning of the session, participants completed the
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971) and were
talked through the possible responses to the sentences they
would hear in the main task, from strong disagreement to strong
agreement (see Fig. 1). Importantly, the balanced numbers of
Christian and Atheist versions of the Religious statements, as
well as an equal proportion of Agree and Disagree statements in
the Moral, Scientific, and Everyday categories enable control of
a very liberal or conservative response style, i.e. consistently
weak or strong agreement or disagreement with statements.
A variety of interpretations were given for each response
key, as some statements required a response that related to
personal opinion whereas some related to factual correctness.
Participants were specifically asked to respond according to
2 This question requires participants to indicate which of seven statements
comes closest to expressing what they believe about God:
1.I don't believe in God.
2. I don't know whether there is a God, and I don't believe there is any
way to find out.
3. I don't believe in a personal God, but I do believe in a Higher Power
of some kind.
4. I find myself believing in God some of the time, but not at others.
5. While I have doubts, I feel that I do believe in God.
6. I know God really exists and I have no doubt about it.
7. Don't know.
Table 1 Sentence pairing and splicing of audio files
Main part of sentence Baseline Critical word
Devoting time to building a good relationship with God is wise
Devoting time to building a good relationship with God is unwise
Ignoring the Bible as the most important source of life instructions is unwise
Ignoring the Bible as the most important source of life instructions is wise
Note: Colours show how identical audio files were spliced together so that each sentence pair (red and blue) was identical up to the point of the critical
word, and the two sister pairs were identical from the start of the baseline (green) to the end of critical words (magenta and brown)
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their views in their “heart of hearts”, not limiting themselves
to expressing views that they felt were publicly acceptable, or
views endorsed by their church, society or family. We
emphasised that we were not looking for what might be seen
as the “majority view” of any community that they identified
with; we instead wanted to know their unique opinion. For
example, it was emphasised that agreeing with the statement
“People who believe in X are wrong” is not the same as saying
that people should not believe in X, or that one would tell a
believer of X that they are wrong.
During testing, participants sat at a distance of 70 cm from the
computer screen. A single trial consisted of the presentation of a
grey fixation dot on the screen and concomitant delivery of the
audio statement through headphones, followed by the presenta-
tion of an image representing the five possible response keys (as
shown in Fig. 1a), which prompted the participant to give a
response. Participants were instructed to look at the grey dot
on the screen while listening to the statement, and to keep their
dominant index finger at a fixed location just below the key-
board. When the response key image appeared on the screen,
they shouldmove their finger and press one of the response keys.
The keyboardwas covered so that only the relevant five response
keys were visible. Participants were instructed to answer as
quickly as possible, basing their responses on gut feeling rather
than long consideration. The next trial was initiated immediately
after the participant’s response. If no response was given after 5
seconds, the next trial commenced.
Before commencing the main task, participants com-
pleted a practice block of 16 items to become familiar with
the protocol. These practice items were designed to reflect
the diversity of topics and linguistic structures found in the
experimental items. The main task was delivered in 10
blocks of 48 items, which were presented in a randomized
order, and participants were encouraged to take breaks
between blocks.
Results
All 20 participants completed the task.
Item pruning
To identify the best 25 sets of items (out of 30) in each cate-
gory (religious, moral, scientific, everyday) to be included in
the final set, we calculated for each item how many of the 20
pilot participants had given the “expected” response for their
group (either strongly or weakly). Item sets were then ranked
by the lowest “expected response” score of any individual
item in that set, and lowest-scoring sets were discarded.
Where there were a number of sets with the same lowest score,
between-condition matching on critical word frequency and
critical word length in syllables was taken into account. Of the
items selected to remain in the inventory, the lowest number
of expected responses to any item (out of 20) was 13 for
Religious items (M = 18.24, SD = 1.66), 17 for Moral items
(M = 19.36, SD = 0.81), 14 for Scientific items (M = 18.58,
SD = 1.57), and 18 for Everyday items (M = 19.59, SD =
0.68).
Item matching
Following selection of the final list of 400 items, independent t
tests confirmed that there were no significant differences be-
tween critical words across the four categories with reference
to word frequency, intensity (dB), and length in syllables (see
Table 2).
However, we noted that items of Everyday knowledge had
a significantly shorter length of critical words in milliseconds
and a shorter length of sentences in words than items of the
other three categories (see Table 2). In case this might be of
concern for some studies, we ascertained that it is possible to
Fig. 1 Visual depiction and instructed meaning of response keys. a Image of the answer keys that appeared on screen to prompt participants to provide a
response. b Provided interpretation for each of the possible answer keys
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replace 20 items from the Everyday category of the main set of
400 items (4031:4034, 4141:4144, 4191:4194, 4251:4254,
and 4291:4294) with 20 items from the Everyday category
of the excluded set of 80 items (4111:4114, 4151:4154,
4171:4174, 4261:4264, and 4271:4274). This yields no sig-
nificant differences in the linguistic and acoustic properties of
critical words and sentences between conditions (see
Table S4). Thus, if needed, these or other extra items could
be used when matching various psycholinguistic properties
across categories and conditions of interest, depending on
the needs of the particular research focus. In Study 2, we used
the original set of 400 items that were selected based on the
number of expected responses.
In order to ensure that the splicing process had not yielded
sentences with acoustically unnatural properties which could
affect participants' behavioural and electrophysiological re-
sponses, four linguistically naive native English speakers lis-
tened to the 400 selected statements in randomised order and
indicated if they detected anything noticeable about the re-
cording. 387/400 items were rated by all raters as sounding
completely natural. For 12 items (spread across all four con-
ditions) a splice junction was identified by one rater, and for
one item a splice junction was detected by two raters. As these
were responses from raters who had been specifically
instructed to listen for anomalies in the recordings, we were
satisfied that the splicing effects would be negligible when
testing participants who were focused on the meaning, rather
than the sound quality of the sentences. Following each pilot
testing session, participants were prompted to give their
thoughts on the task they had just completed, and none men-
tioned noticing anything about the acoustic quality of the spo-
ken stimuli.
Construct validity of the Cambridge Psycholinguistic
Inventory of Christian Beliefs
To assess the construct validity of the averaged Religiosity
score of the CPICB, the scores were correlated with the
summed scores of the Christian Orthodoxy Scale (Fullerton
& Hunsberger, 1982), which is a widely used scale with
strong psychometric properties that assesses orthodoxy of
Christian beliefs (Adams et al., 2018; Altemeyer &
Hunsberger, 1992; Johnson et al., 1993; Lupfer et al., 1988;
Pancer et al., 1995; Sanders et al., 2015; Truelove& Joireman,
2009). In the standard coding, the Christian Orthodoxy Scale
summed scores range from 24 to 168, with 96 marking the
centre point that separates Christian and Atheist responses.
For ease of use we have rescaled this score so that it ranges
from −72 to +72, with 0 as the centre point, a minus score
shows a generally Atheist outlook, and a plus score a Christian
one, with larger absolute numbers denoting stronger views.
Individual responses to the selected 100 Religious items of





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































agree”). Given that half of the religious statements were
designed to elicit Christian Agree/Atheist Disagree re-
sponses, while the other half of the religious statements
were designed to elicit Christian Disagree/Atheist Agree
responses, the average score would have been close to 0
for both groups of participants. We thus reversed the
positive or negative sign of Christian Disagree/Atheist
Agree statements for all participants, after which a mean
score close to +2 indicated that the participant usually
responded with a strongly Christian response, i.e.
selecting “I agree” for Christian Agree items or “I dis-
agree” for Christian Disagree items. Again, a mean
score close to −2 showed more Atheist responses, i.e.
selecting “I agree” for Atheist Agree items or “I dis-
agree” for Atheist Disagree items. The absolute values
of mean scores denoted the strength of views.
Given that our participants were specifically recruited
as having extreme scores (< −45 or > +45) on the
Christian Orthodoxy Scale, the data were not normally
distributed, so the non-parametric correlation was calcu-
lated. We observed a significant positive association be-
tween the two measures of religiosity (Spearman’s rho =
0.942, p < 0.001, see Fig. 2), providing preliminary
confirmation of the construct validity of the Religious
beliefs category of the CPICB.
Internal consistency of the Cambridge
Psycholinguistic Inventory of Christian Beliefs
To assess the internal consistency of the CPICB, i.e. whether
different sentences measure the same concept, we computed
Cronbach’s alpha separately for the Religious, Moral,
Scientific and Everyday categories of the inventory.
Cronbach’s alpha indicates how closely related a set of items
are as a group: < 0.70 is regarded as poor or unacceptable,
0.70–0.79 as fair, 0.80–0.89 as good, and ≥ 0.90 as excellent
(Cicchetti, 1994).
Given that Cronbach’s alpha is sensitive to missing data,
we replaced missing values for individual responses with the
mean of the whole group for the Moral, Scientific and
Everyday categories, whereas, when replacing missing values
in the Religious section, means were calculated separately for
Christians and Atheists. Across 400 inventory items and 20
participants (8000 data points), only 42 responses (0.53% of
the data) were missing (see Table S5), confirming the feasi-
bility of the materials and study design, specifically, that par-
ticipants were able to process the sentences and respond with-
in the allocated response period of 5 seconds.
Given that half of the sentences were designed to produce
“I agree” and another half “I disagree” responses, inconsistent
positive and negative correlations would have distorted the
assessment of internal consistency. Thus, before calculating
Cronbach’s alpha, the positive/negative sign of Disagree item
responses was reversed.3 For the Religious category, Christian
Disagree/Atheist Agree items were reversed. A significant
proportion of items yielded identical responses from all par-
ticipants, e.g. all of them disagreed with the item and chose a
−2 response, and hence had zero variance. Such items were
removed from the scale before calculating Cronbach’s alpha
(see Table 3). For the remaining items, we observed excellent
internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha > 0.90) for both indi-
vidual sections of the inventory as well as the full inventory
when all participants were analysed together (see Table 3).
Subgroup analysis indicated lower internal consistency for
the Atheist group (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.76).
Study 2: The confirmatory assessment
of the Cambridge Psycholinguistic Inventory
of Christian Beliefs
Aims of the study
Encouraged by the preliminary findings of Study 1, we aimed
to replicate them with a larger sample of participants.
Specifically, given that only relatively strong Christians and
Atheists were tested in Study 1, we wanted to extend inven-
tory assessment to more moderate Christians and Atheists.
Furthermore, in addition to the assessment of construct valid-
ity and internal consistency of the inventory, we aimed to
assess its test–retest reliability.
Fig. 2 Association between religiosity scores of the Christian Orthodoxy
Scale and the Cambridge Psycholinguistic Inventory of Christian Beliefs
(N = 20, Study 1)
3 In the Project registration, this information is not clearly presented, and it can
be understood that positive/negative signs were reversed only for the Christian
Disagree/Atheist Agree items in the Religious category. We confirm that
positive/negative signs were also reversed for all Disagree items in the
Moral, Scientific and Everyday categories.
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Participants
Forty participants were selected from a larger database of >
350 participants willing to take part in studies on religiosity,
aiming to represent the full continuum of beliefs from strongly
Christian to strongly Atheist, i.e. including those with middle-
ground beliefs, unlike in Study 1. As before, participants were
recruited by advertising our study on the online portal of
Cambridge Psychology Research and university advertise-
ment boards, local churches and atheist societies, as well as
by sending an invitation to an email list of the Faculty of
Divinity at the University of Cambridge, and through word
of mouth. Interested individuals completed the same online
screening questionnaire as those taking part in Study 1. Two
participants could not complete the second session of the
study due to medical reasons and were replaced by another
two volunteers.
Ten participants were recruited to each of four groups:
Strong-Minded Atheists (Christian Orthodoxy Scale scores
of −45 to −72), Moderate Atheists (COS scores of 0 to −45),
Moderate Christians (COS scores of 0 to 45) and Strong-
Minded Christians (COS scores of 45–72). Contrary to
Study 1, participation in Christian practices and self-
identification as Christian or Atheist was not taken into ac-
count as there was considerable variation among the “moder-
ate” groups, with some participants’ positive or negative di-
rection of COS scores not matching their self-identification,
and some considering themselves agnostic or spiritual rather
than Atheist or Christian. Among Strong-Minded Christians,
participants self-identified as “Anglican” (5), “Newfrontiers”
(2), “Evangelical Lutheran” (1), “Catholic” (1) and “Quaker/
Anglican” (1). Among Moderate Christians, participants re-
ported belonging to “Anglican” (3), “Protestant” (1),
“Salvation Army” (1), “Orthodox” (1) and “Catholic” (2) de-
nominations, whereas two participants did not report denom-
inational identity. Among Moderate Atheists, one reported
being “Anglican” and one being “Orthodox”.
A t test comparing the absolute COS scores of Atheists
(46) and Christians (45.6) (pooling across Moderate and
Strong-Minded groups in each case) showed no significant
difference (t(38) = 0.57, p = 0.995). Likewise, there were
no significant group differences in the absolute COS
scores between Strong-Minded Atheists (64.4) and
Strong-Minded Christians (65.3) (t(18) = −0.30, p = 0.77)
or between Moderate Atheists (27.5) and Moderate
Christians (25.8) (t(18) = 0.28, p = 0.78).
All participants were aged 18–45 and identified them-
selves as native speakers of English. A one-way ANOVA
to test for group differences showed no significant differ-
ences in age (F(3,36) = 0.45, p = 0.72) or verbal IQ
(F(3,36) = 0.37, p = 0.78). There were comparable gender
ratios between participant groups, with 2–4 male partici-
pants in each group. Details of participants in the four
groups are given in Table S6.
The study protocol was approved by the Cambridge
Psychology Research Ethics Committee (Approval No:
PRE.2018.040), and it was carried out in accordance with
the guidelines of the Helsinki declaration for the treatment of
human participants. Participants were compensated at a rate of
£10 per hour.
Inventory statements
Based on the findings of Study 1, the final version of the
inventory used in Study 2 consisted of 400 statements of
which 100 related to Christian beliefs (or lack thereof), 100
to moral beliefs, 100 to scientific abstract knowledge and 100
to everyday knowledge, which were selected from the first
version of the inventory consisting of 480 statements (see
Study 1). The remaining statements were kept in the original
sets of four, consisting of two “sister” pairs (see Table 1).
Critical words of statements were a maximum of three sylla-
bles long, and there were no significant linguistic and psycho-
acoustic differences between critical words across the four
conditions (Religious, Moral, Scientific, Everyday) with ref-
erence to frequency, length in syllables and intensity (dB) (see
Table 2).
Behavioural testing
Individual participants took part in two sessions of behaviour-
al testing, which were carried out by the same experimenter
Table 3 Internal consistency of the Cambridge Psycholinguistic Inventory of Christian Beliefs (Study 1)
Religious Moral Scientific Everyday Full inventory
Christian Atheist All
Participants, N 10 10 20 20 20 20 20
Items, N 100 100 100 100 100 100 400
Items excluded, N 3 25 0 12 10 37 59
Cronbach’s alpha 0.96 0.755 0.998 0.954 0.94 0.934 0.987
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using the same equipment in the same lab. We planned the
delay between visit 1 and visit 2 to last between two weeks
and twomonths.Most of the participants preferred the shortest
possible delay and there were on average 18.5 days (SD = 7.1)
between visits 1 and 2. A one-way ANOVA to test for partic-
ipant group differences showed no significant differences in
test–retest interval between the two sessions (F(3,36) = 0.83,
p = 0.49; see Table S6).
As for Study 1, the experiment took place in one of the
behavioural testing rooms of the Department of Psychology
at the University of Cambridge. The room was equipped with
a laptop (Apple Inc.) connected to a 22-inch LCD screen, a
standard QWERTY keyboard, a pair of headphones, a desk
and a chair. The experiment was programmed using
MATLAB (MathWorks, Inc.) with the Psychophysics
Toolbox version 3 (PTB-3) (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al.,
2007; Pelli, 1997).
At the beginning of the first session, participants signed
informed consent forms and completed the Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971), after which they read
instructions about the study and were talked through the pos-
sible responses to the sentences they would hear in the main
task (see Fig. 1). The experimental procedure was identical to
Study 1 (see above), except that due to a smaller number of
items the main task was delivered in 10 blocks of 40 items,
which were presented in a randomized order.
During the second session, participants read the same in-
structions about the study and were talked through the possi-
ble responses to the sentences they would hear in the main
task in the same way as they were introduced to the task
during the first session. Afterwards, participants carried out
the practise block with the same 16 sentences, followed up
by the main task delivered in 10 blocks of 40 items, and they
were again encouraged to take breaks between blocks. Items
were presented in a randomized order, which was generated
independently of the first session. Once participants complet-
ed the task, the experimenter asked them to fill in the
Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005)4 and adminis-
tered verbal IQ sections (Vocabulary and Similarities) of the
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence, Second Edition
(WASI-II; Wechsler, 2011).
The data analysis plan for Study 2 was preregistered at the
OSF Registries, as described in the following. For more de-
tails, see https://osf.io/vrnxg/
Construct validity of the Cambridge Psycholinguistic
Inventory of Christian Beliefs
To assess the construct validity of the averaged Religiosity
score of the CPICB, it was correlated with the summed scores
of the Christian Orthodoxy Scale (Fullerton & Hunsberger,
1982). Similarly to Study 1, the COS score was rescaled to
range from −72 to +72, with 0 as the centre point, a minus
score showing a generally Atheist outlook, and a plus score a
Christian one, with larger absolute numbers denoting stronger
views. For the Religious category of the CPICB, a mean score
close to +2 indicates that the participant responded with a
strongly Christian response, whereas a mean score close to
−2 shows strongly Atheist responses.
Given that the 40 participants were specifically recruit-
ed to cover different ranges of the Christian Orthodoxy
Scale, their Christian Orthodoxy Scale summed scores
had a platykurtic distribution with flat tails (excess kurto-
sis = −1.52) and did not appear to be normally distributed
(Shapiro-Wilk test: W = 0.90, p = 0.002). Thus, non-
parametric Spearman’s rank-order correlation was calcu-
lated to assess the construct validity of the Religiosity
score of the CPICB.
Internal consistency of the Cambridge
Psycholinguistic Inventory of Christian Beliefs
To assess the internal consistency of the CPICB, i.e.
whether the 100 sentences within each category measure
the same concept, we computed Cronbach’s alpha sepa-
rately for the Religious, Moral, Scientific and Everyday
sections of the Inventory and for the full inventory.
Cronbach’s alpha < 0.70 was regarded as poor or unac-
ceptable, 0.70–0.79 as fair, 0.80–0.89 as good and ≥
0.90 as excellent (Cicchetti, 1994).
Given that Cronbach’s alpha is sensitive to missing data,
we replaced missing values for individual responses with the
mean of the whole group (N = 40) for theMoral, Scientific and
Everyday sections. When replacing missing values in the
Religious section, means were calculated separately for each
subgroup of Christians and Atheists (N = 10).
Given that half of the sentences were designed to produce
“I agree” and another half “I disagree” responses, inconsistent
positive and negative correlations would have distorted the
assessment of internal consistency. Thus, before calculating
Cronbach’s alpha, the negative/positive sign of Disagree items
was reversed for the Moral, Scientific and Everyday sections
of the inventory. Likewise, the negative/positive sign of
Christian Disagree/Atheist Agree items was reversed for the
Religious section of the inventory. Items with identical re-
sponses from all participants were removed from the scale
before calculating Cronbach’s alpha.
Test–retest reliability of the Cambridge
Psycholinguistic Inventory of Christian Beliefs
To assess test–retest reliability of the mean scores within each
category of the inventory (Religious, Moral, Scientific and
Everyday), a two-way mixed model intraclass correlation4 Results of the Cognitive Reflection Test will be reported elsewhere.
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coefficient of an absolute agreement type (ICC 3.1) was used
to compare performance on sessions 1 and 2 (Koo& Li, 2016;
Shrout & Fleiss, 1979). Reliability with ICC values < 0.40
was regarded as poor, 0.40–0.59 as fair, 0.60–0.74 as good,
and ≥ 0.75 as excellent (Cicchetti, 1994). In addition to the
ICC, we report the 95% confidence interval, and F statistic
with true value 0 and its significance (p).
For each session, a mean response score was calculated sepa-
ratelyfor theReligious,Moral,ScientificandEverydaysectionsof
the inventory. Given that half of the statements were designed to
elicit Agree responses, while the other half of the statements were
designed to elicit Disagree responses, the average score would be
close to 0 for all groups of participants.We thus have reversed the
positive or negative sign of (Christian)Disagree statements for all
participants. In the Religious category, a mean score close to +2
indicated that the participant usually responded with a strongly
Christianresponse,whereasameanscorecloseto−2showedmore
Atheist responses. In addition to themean scores over both agree-
ment conditions, we reported test–retest reliability statistics sepa-
rately for the (Christian) Agree and (Christian) Disagree items.
Results
Construct validity of the Cambridge Psycholinguistic
Inventory of Christian Beliefs
We observed a significant positive correlation between the
COS and the CPICB measures of religiosity (Spearman’s
rho = 0.915, p = 1.5E−16, see Fig. 3), confirming the construct
validity of the Religious beliefs category of the CPICB.
Internal consistency of the Cambridge
Psycholinguistic Inventory of Christian Beliefs
Across 400 inventory items and 40 participants (16000 data
points), only 82 responses (0.51% of data) were missing (see
Table S7), confirming the feasibility of the materials and study
design, specifically, that participants were able to process the
sentences and respond within the allocated time. Regarding
individual inventory items that participants did not respond to
on time, most were missed by just one or two participants. In
the Religious category, two items were missed by three par-
ticipants (items 1123 and 1293) and one item was missed by
four participants (item 1273). In the Scientific category, item
3013 was missed by three participants.
We observed excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s
alpha ≥ 0.90) at a full group level (N = 40) for both individual
sections of the inventory as well as the full inventory (see
Table 4). When the internal consistency of Religious items
was tested separately for each subgroup, it was found to
be excellent for Strong-Minded Atheists, Moderate Atheists
and Moderate Christians (Cronbach’s alpha ≥ 0.94), but poor
or unacceptable for Strong-Minded Christians (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.57). This was caused by a small number of items
which elicited unexpected responses from this group. After
excluding two of the problematic items (1162: “People who
believe that the birth of Jesus was predicted in advance are
wrong”, and 1173: “The claim that, after death, human exis-
tence ceases completely is unlikely”), fair internal consistency
was observed for the remaining Religious items in the Strong-
Minded Christian subgroup (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.71). Good
internal consistency was observed for the remaining Religious
items in the Strong-Minded Christian subgroup (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.80) when an additional four problematic items were
excluded (1133: “People who say Christ will never return to
earth are wrong”, 1233: “The claim that belief in God limits
human knowledge is misguided”, 1073: “That God only exists
in people's imaginations is doubtful”, and 1063: “The claim
that Jesus was just an influential man in history, like many
others, is untrue”).
Test–retest reliability of the Cambridge
Psycholinguistic Inventory of Christian Beliefs
For one participant, most of the trials were registered as unre-
sponsive during Session 2 (377 out of 400), most likely due to
a keyboard malfunction. Hence, we excluded this participant
from the test–retest reliability analysis, with a remaining total
of 39 participants. When comparing the mean scores of the
CPICB between Session 1 and Session 2, ICC values indicat-
ed excellent test–retest reliability for the Religious and Moral
categories, good reliability for the Scientific category, and fair
reliability for the Everyday category (see Table 5 and Fig. 4).
Fig. 3 Association between religiosity scores of the Christian Orthodoxy
Scale and the Cambridge Psycholinguistic Inventory of Christian Beliefs
(N = 40, Study 2)
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Discussion
Here we present a new instrument—the Cambridge
Psycholinguistic Inventory of Christian Beliefs—suitable for
studying Christian religious beliefs in an experimental setting
involving behavioural and neuroimaging paradigms. We de-
veloped and tested the CPICB over the course of two studies,
ensuring that it meets the six criteria set out at the beginning of
the project (see Introduction). In particular, we created a set of
100 audio-recorded religious (dis)belief statements, which can
be experimentally contrasted with control sets of sentences
reflecting moral beliefs (N = 100), abstract scientific knowl-
edge (N = 100) or empirical facts about everyday life (N =
100). The critical word that reveals the meaning of each sen-
tence is always placed at the end, thereby enabling temporally
precise measurement of reaction times or neurophysiological
responses. Each statement has two orthogonal versions con-
structed with identical strings of words, differing only in the
final critical words so that one version is expected to elicit an
Agree response, and the other a Disagree response. This way,
the CPICB ensures that baseline periods of Agree and
Disagree conditions are psychoacoustically and linguistically
perfectly matched up to the moment of the presentation of
critical words. Furthermore, each pair of statements has a “sis-
ter pair” of statements with reversed association between the
two critical words and Agree/Disagree responses, which
allowed us to match psychoacoustic and linguistic properties
of critical words across Agree and Disagree conditions.
Finally, the critical words are matched across religious, moral,
scientific and everyday conditions for word frequency, length
and sound intensity.
The CPICB shows robust psychometric properties, includ-
ing its construct validity, internal consistency and test–retest
reliability. Mean responses to the CPICB religious (dis)belief
statements were very strongly associated with the mean scores
of the Christian Orthodoxy Scale (Fullerton & Hunsberger,
1982), with correlation coefficients being > 0.9 in both
Studies 1 and 2. We thus conclude that the CPICB is a valid
















































































































































































































Table 5 Test–retest reliability of the Cambridge Psycholinguistic














Religious .974 .951 .986 74.860 38 2.7E−26
Moral .843 .721 .914 11.696 38 4.7E−12
Scientific .747 .566 .859 6.766 38 2.1E−8
Everyday .524 .252 .719 3.161 38 0.0003
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studies using the CPICB, participants can be recruited based
on their responses either to the full Christian Orthodoxy Scale
(Fullerton & Hunsberger, 1982) or its short version
(Hunsberger, 1989). We also observed excellent test–retest
reliability for the Religious statements of the CPICB,
confirming that the religious belief statements were under-
standable and participants provided highly consistent re-
sponses on two separate occasions which transpired two or
more weeks apart.
While there was excellent internal consistency for each
category of the CPICB when testing a full group of partici-
pants (N = 20 in Study 1 and N = 40 in Study 2), we observed
that internal consistency was not stable when tested within
small subgroups (N = 10). In Study 1, Strong-Minded
Christians (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.96) showed higher consis-
tency than Strong-Minded Atheists (Cronbach’s alpha =
0.76), whereas in Study 2, Strong-Minded Atheists
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.95) showed higher consistency than
Strong-Minded Christians (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.57). It seems
that several Christian participants rated a small proportion of
Religious items very unexpectedly compared to the rest of the
Strong-Minded Christians. Given a large inter-individual var-
iability and the subjective nature of religious beliefs, it is pos-
sible that a similar deviance from predicted responses and low
internal consistency of Religious items is unavoidable when
testing a small group of participants. Another factor which
might explain the unexpected responses from the Christian
participants is that the formulation and selection of religious
statements were informed by a relatively small sample of theo-
logians and Christian “experts”. Because there is a high num-
ber of distinct and varied Christian theological viewpoints,
just as internal consistency is difficult to achieve within a
small group of participants, so too is consistency difficult to
achieve amongst a small group of experts. Finally, it is impor-
tant to highlight that the estimate of Cronbach’s alpha lacks
both power and precision when the sample size is very small
(Bonett, 2002; Feldt & Ankenmann, 1999), which was likely
the case when testing participant subgroups in the present
study. It is also possible that we overestimated Cronbach’s
alpha, and smaller reliability coefficients could be expected
with a larger sample size (Javali et al., 2011). Nevertheless, we
decided to carry out and include subgroup results because
participant samples of a similar size are likely to be used in
neuroimaging experiments using CPICB. For researchers that
require high internal consistency within a small group of par-
ticipants, e.g. N < 20, we recommend assessing internal con-
sistency in their own dataset, removing problematic items one
by one until satisfactory internal consistency is observed.
A major strength of the CPICB is that statements are care-
fully controlled and items are closely matched across condi-
tions, with each item being presented in almost identical
“agree” and “disagree” versions, and identical critical word lists
used across agree and disagree versions (see details in Study 1,
Methods). These measures make the CPICB suitable for
neurocognitive studies where such matching is necessary in
order to isolate the brain response to a specific difference
Fig. 4 Association between the mean scores of the Cambridge
Psycholinguistic Inventory of Christian Beliefs categories obtained on
session 1 and session 2 (N = 39, Study 2). To calculate the mean score,
responses to (Christian) Disagree statements were reversed. While test–
retest reliability was assessed by calculating ICC, Spearman rank-order
correlation coefficients are reported in this figure.
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between two sentences while also reducing the variation be-
tween conditions that might otherwise occur as a result of a
participant having different levels of familiarity with the con-
tent or words of particular items. However, future researchers
should be aware that while the sets of critical words have been
matched across conditions for word frequency, intensity (dB)
and length in syllables (see Table 2), other lexical differences
remain which may need to be controlled for depending on the
research question under investigation. For example, critical
words are not matched for word category, concreteness
(Holcomb et al., 1999; although of noun pairs used as critical
words only two pairs out of 25 are abstract rather than concrete)
or effects of valence (Jiang et al., 2014). Due to inherent dif-
ferences between the four categories of items, the critical words
used for Religious and Moral items tend to be more strongly
valenced (e.g. wrong/right, correct/incorrect, anger/tolerance),
while those used in Scientific and Everyday items are more
neutral (e.g. hot/cold, sleepy/hungry, metal/paper).
The advantage of psychoacoustic and linguistic matching
of long statements comes at the cost that it can be difficult to
construct sets of sentences (such as the sister-pair sets shown
in Table 1) that meet these technical requirements while
sounding equally natural in each condition. This was particu-
larly the case with Religious items where it was necessary to
elicit the required opposing responses from Christians and
Atheists. In creating the CPICB, we aimed to focus on and
measure whether or not a Christian holds a particular religious
belief, and characterised the Atheist viewpoint in terms of a
lack of such Christian beliefs. Consequently, in order to create
an item that an Atheist would disagree with which ends with a
negative critical word (i.e. the third of the four sentences
shown in Table 1), it was often necessary for the main part
of the sentence to express a negative belief or action, such as
Ignoring the Bible as the most important source of life instruc-
tions is unwise. This led to some awkward double-negative
sentences which participants reported in piloting were difficult
to process in the time available, for example The belief that
prayers are never answered by God is untrue. Through re-
peated piloting and revision of materials, we improved these
sentences. Where possible we replaced negative verbs with
verbs such as “ignoring” or “rejecting” so that the first nega-
tive part of the sentence was, at least in grammatical terms,
presented positively, and found other ways to express negative
concepts such as replacing That God doesn’t exist is doubtful
with That God only exists in people's imaginations is doubtful.
While we were largely successful in replacing or rephrasing
the most difficult-to-process sentences, it is still the case that
some sentences of this type are slightly more complicated to
process. Of the six items that showed lower internal consis-
tency in Strong-Minded Christians, five of these were of this
“Christian Agree/Atheist Disagree plus negative critical
word” type, which suggests that the more complex sentence
structure may have led several Strong-Minded Christians to
misinterpret the meaning of the sentence under time con-
straints in Study 2. Arguably, it could be that hearing a seem-
ingly anti-Christian main body of a sentence may cause
Strong-Minded Christians distress, in which case they may
overlook the meaning of the critical word and respond instead
with their feelings about the main body of the sentence. It
could also be that it is more onerous to revise a negative view
than a positive view, so this coupled with the stress of a com-
plex sentence and the stress of hearing a negation of your faith
may contribute to misinterpretations. Importantly, a subgroup
of Atheists rather than Christians showed lower internal con-
sistency in Study 1. As all subgroups were matched by IQ, this
is likely a random effect caused by some participants finding
some sentences harder to process when facing the situational
demands of the laboratory experiment.
Another area where the creation of perfectly matched
sentences has had to be balanced with naturalness is in the
splicing of the audio files. As files are spliced so that items
in each condition are identical up to the critical word, a re-
searcher can be confident that any response differences across
conditions are due to the critical word alone, and not to any
minor intonation/volume/emphasis differences in the main
part of the sentence. However, due to the way that the pronun-
ciation of a word in connected speech is influenced by the
words preceding and following it, in some cases it required
compromise in order to ensure that the baseline section had
the same duration over all four statements in a sister-pair set.
For example, due to catenation between a final consonant and
an initial vowel in connected speech, the “is” in “is wise” is
pronounced differently from the “is” in “is unwise”, as in the
latter there is no gap between the two words. In such cases we
digitally manipulated the baseline in order to find the best fit
that allowed an identical baseline to be used in both versions
of the sentence, while retaining the natural rhythm and sound
of both. As our pre-experiment checks showed that naive par-
ticipants were occasionally able to identify a splice junction,
this raises the question of whether participants’ natural pro-
cessing could be influenced by (possibly subconscious)
awareness of these minor changes to the natural timing of
the sentence. While this may be an issue in participants
who have direct experience in splicing audio materials or
are otherwise hyper-aware of connected speech patterns,
the fact that 387/400 items were rated by all 4 raters as
sounding completely natural satisfies us that this is unlike-
ly to be an issue in naive participants. In addition, all
participants in both study 1 and 2 were asked for their
impressions at the end of the experiment, and none report-
ed detecting anything anomalous with regard to the natu-
ralness of the audio files.
While listening to a sentence, certain expectations naturally
build up regarding how the sentence will end. Kutas and
Hillyard (1984) showed that the N400 response to the final
word in a sentence is strongly affected by its cloze probability,
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i.e. the probability of that particular word completing the sen-
tence, with stronger N400 responses to words that were not
predicted. For this reason, in future psychometric or psycho-
linguistic work using the CPICB, it would be informative to
assess the predictability of critical words (as in Fondevila
et al., 2016) in order to assess differences across sentence
types (Religious, Moral, Scientific, Everyday) and agreement
types (Agree vs Disagree sentences) with regard to the extent
to which participants’ expectations of how the sentence will
end are violated. Recent advances in computer modelling
have led to the development of neural language models that
predict the probability of a word based on the sentence con-
text, and these predictability estimates have been shown to
closely match with ERP responses (Helibron et al. 2019;
Merkx & Frank, 2020). This opens up avenues for future
research where word predictability could be statistically con-
trolled for without the need for data collection from human
participants. We would expect that predictability would be
substantially lower in Disagree items than Agree items for
Moral, Scientific and Everyday items, and that for Religious
items it would depend on the Religious viewpoint of the par-
ticipant (with items the participant agrees with again having a
higher predictability).
One of the key limitations of the CPICB is its narrow focus
on only one dimension of religiosity—explicit religious
beliefs—among Christians. Relatively recent developments
in the study of Christianity (or, as some scholars are careful
to specify, the study of Christianities) have highlighted the
intricate nuances and diversities that exist across the spectrum
of Christian beliefs and practices (Cannell, 2006; Robbins,
2014). Christianity is indelibly shaped by the particular cul-
tures in which it exists, and it would thus be extremely prob-
lematic to assume that all Christian individuals or all Christian
communities embrace and adhere to the same precise doc-
trines. Furthermore, preoccupation with doctrinal belief is of
particular importance to Protestant Christians (Harding, 2001;
Luhrmann, 2012; Webster, 2013), whereas belief is not con-
sistently interesting or significant for individuals from other
religious contexts (Pouillon, 2016; Ritchie, 2002; Coleman,
2009). Indeed, even within some Protestant contexts, belief
is not always a central indicator of one’s religious com-
mitment or fervour (Howell, 2007; Ruel, 1982) and thus it
cannot be assumed that one’s doctrinal beliefs are undeni-
able indicators of one’s religious commitments. It is im-
portant for us to highlight this insight that doctrinal belief
is not always the central dimension of religiosity, precisely
because our study was designed to study an individual’s
inclination to either agree with or differ from a particular
religious belief statement.
The sheer diversity of doctrinal beliefs within the various
expressions of Christianity worldwide make it difficult, if not
impossible, to speak of “Christian belief” as if it were a ho-
mogeneous and monolithic phenomenon. The particular
theological viewpoints which informed our understanding of
Christian beliefs were located within the cultural and theolog-
ical milieus of Cambridge, UK, which is a progressive univer-
sity town. There are a range of Christian theological view-
points which were not explicitly foregrounded in our ques-
tions and it might very well be the case that an individual
who strongly self-identifies as a Christian would not score as
such upon using our inventory. One wonders, for example, if
Christians whose theological and cultural contexts are signif-
icantly different from those of the Christians who guided our
statements (see, for examples of strikingly different Christian
theologies, the ethnographic accounts of Bauman (2015),
Roberts (2016), Robbins (2014), and others who have studied
Christian communities in non-Western cultural milieus)
would score strongly as a “Christian” on the CPICB. We do
not take this to indicate that the CPICB is inaccurate; rather,
we take it as a reflection of the sheer diversity of Christianities
that exist across the globe. In this vein, it is useful to bear in
mind that the CPICB was developed with specific theologies
as a point of reference for what it entails to be a Christian. It is
noteworthy that, while the majority of our participants self-
identified with Protestant forms of Christianity, we had par-
ticipants who self-identified with other Christian denomina-
tions; the CPICB worked equally well amongst all partici-
pants. However, the significant rise of Pentecostal
Christianity and Charismatic Christianity worldwide might
not be well-suited to the CPICB questions, which are more
angled towards a few particular types of Christian denomina-
tions in the UK. In other words, the definition of Christianity
that we worked with was undergirded by two premises: firstly,
there was an assumption that belief itself is a central way of
determining Christian identity. Secondly, particular doctrinal
beliefs were foregrounded over others.
With the above-mentioned caveats inmind, we nonetheless
feel that it has been important and valuable to focus on indi-
viduals’ responses to statements of (religious) belief, and to
construct those statements of belief with reference to the spe-
cific theological milieus that we did. Pragmatically, it will be
easier to carry out quantitative group-level studies with partic-
ipants committed to fundamental theologies, which allows us
to predict participants’ answers and plan group comparisons.
Contrary to this, participants recruited from communities with
more liberal or less defined theologies would likely provide
very diverse answers to the same questions, making it very
hard to contrast groups of religious and non-religious
individuals.
Finally, even though we observed an excellent internal
consistency of responses to religious statements at a full group
level in both studies, lower consistency within smaller sub-
groups suggests that the inventory may cover beliefs that yield
varying responses within and across individuals. When devel-
oping the CPICB, we aimed to cover five broad categories of
Christian beliefs, namely anthropological beliefs, God
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attributes, prophecies and eschatology, supernatural agents,
andmiracles (see Table S2). Given that these categories reflect
different dimensions of Christian theology, individuals may
be more likely to agree with some items, e.g. statements re-
garding God attributes, than with other items, e.g. statements
about biblical miracles. For instance, when piloting the initial
version of the inventory, we noted that statements regarding
Satan and devils yielded very contradictory responses from
Christian participants, and eventually we removed these items
from the CPICB. It is however likely that the remaining items
would form distinct clusters of relatively weaker or stronger
beliefs, especially among less fundamental participants. This
should be investigated in the future using factor analysis. We
could not carry out factor analysis in the current experimental
study due to the sample size. It is recommended that a ratio of
the number of cases to the number of variables involved in the
factor analysis would be 5–15 participants per variable
(Hatcher, 1994; Nunnally, 1978; Pett et al., 2003). With 100
items in the Religious condition, we would need at least 500
participants. Given that it is not feasible to run lab experiments
with such a large group of participants, a more suitable ap-
proach would be a follow-up online study asking a larger sam-
ple of participants to respond to 100 statements of religious
beliefs. Identified dimensions of Christian beliefs may also
have implications for neurophysiological research, e.g. distinct
inventory components may be associated with different degrees
of violation of the semantic predictions or affective responses.
We conclude that the CPICB is a reliable tool and we hope
it will facilitate new research lines in the experimental psy-
chology and cognitive neuroscience of religion. The CPICB is
available (open access) on the project’s OSF site: https://osf.
io/t85mr/ (DOI 10.17605/OSF.IO/T85MR). Users can freely
download audio-recorded items of the CPICB in both their
final version suitable for use in experiments, and in the earlier
splicing version that allows researchers to extract and manip-
ulate different parts of the sentences. In addition to the 400
items used in Study 2, we provide 80 items excluded after
completion of Study 1 as well as an additional 16 items that
can be used for practise at the beginning of experiments.
Furthermore, we provide the full list of all items, information
about temporal structure and duration of different parts of
sentences, loudness and frequencies of critical words, and
other meta information. Finally, we provide both raw and
processed data of Studies 1 and 2.
Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary
material available at https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-021-01632-3.
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